United Nations A/60/96/Add.1

General Assembly

Distr.: General
9 January 2006

Original: English

Sixtieth session
Agenda item 92
Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification

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Report of the Secretary-General

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06-20397 (E) 180106

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Islamic Republic of Iran

[Original: English]
[28 December 2005]

The attainment of the objective of security, as an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of the international community, which has adopted different measures, to advance this objective. The General Assembly, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, devoted to disarmament, recognized that "among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority".[1] The Assembly further agreed that "in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements".[2]

In addition to the general principles elaborated in the Final Document, the Disarmament Commission agreed, by consensus, on the sixteen principles related to verification, which were the result of long and painstaking deliberations.[3] The panel of government experts, to be established in 2006 on the basis of equitable geographic distribution, will be entrusted with further exploring the work of the Commission and its sixteen principles of verification. In our opinion, the success of the panel greatly depends on taking stock of the different views of all States on the above-mentioned principles.

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the work of the panel on the question of verification in all its aspects should be based on the principles already agreed in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session and by the Disarmament Commission.

We concur with the view that verification is not an aim in itself, and that it is only an important and an integral part of all arms control and disarmament agreements and is aimed at building confidence and ensuring the observance of agreements by all parties. Verification provisions of disarmament agreements need to be carefully drafted in order to ensure the interests and concerns of respective parties. Verification procedures may include intrusive arrangements such as on-site inspection. In such a case, any abuse or interference beyond agreed verification procedures should be avoided. Verification is not an element independent from other aspects of agreements. Therefore, it can not be implemented without due regard for the other aspects of the respective agreements.

Verification activities by the concerned parties or by an organization should be conducted at the request of and with the explicit consent of the parties.

In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, once agreement is reached on the verification provisions by all parties and implemented by the competent authority or concerned parties, all States parties to such an agreement should abide by the result

[1] Resolution S-10/2, para. 20.
[2] Ibid., para. 91.
[3] See A/51/182, section G, part I.

of verification and refrain from making unsubstantiated allegations or resorting to unilateral actions.

Funding of the verification activities and the techniques and technologies used in verification processes in accordance with the provisions of the relevant agreement are of great importance, which need to be elaborated in detail, either in the negotiation phase or in the implementation process, as has been the case in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Avoiding duplication of the work by various bodies and specialized agencies engaging in the field of verification such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is imperative. It is therefore wise to invite those bodies to share their experience in the field of verification, in a proper manner. At the request of and with the explicit consent of the parties to an agreement, the United Nations could also have a role in the field of verification for such an agreement. The credibility of the work of the panel also depends on the appropriate political representation in its membership.

The Islamic Republic of Iran attaches great importance to the issue of verification in all its aspects and looks forward to an in-depth discussion in this regard within the framework of the United Nations.